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Abstract. This paper explores one aspect of God’s omniscience, that is, his 
knowledge of human minds. In §1 I  spell out a  traditional notion of divine 
knowledge, and in §2 I argue that our understanding of the thoughts of others 
is a distinct kind of knowledge from that involved in knowledge of the physical 
world; it involves empathizing with thinkers. In §3 I show how this is relevant 
to the question of how, and whether, God understands the thoughts of man. 
There is, we shall see, some tension between the alleged direct nature of God’s 
intuition-based knowledge and the empathetic nature of understanding others.
I. omNISCIeNCe
According to a conception of God derived from St. Anselm, God is the 
greatest being that can be conceived – that ‘than which nothing greater 
can be thought’ (Anselm 1077–8: 93). He is the omni-God: omnipotent, 
omnibenevolent and omniscient. His omniscience is expressed in 
various ways: his knowledge is ‘as complete as it is possible for a state 
of knowledge to be’ (morris 1991: 84); ‘in God there exists the most 
perfect knowledge’ (Aquinas ST, 1a, 14, I) and God has the ‘best possible 
knowledge in the best possible way’ (rogers 2000: 71). It can also be 
expressed more technically: since perfect knowledge must involve 
knowing everything, then it must be the case ‘that, for all p, if p, then God 
knows that p’ (Kenny 1979: 10). Variations on this theme include: ‘for 
every proposition an omniscient being either knows it or knows it to be 
false’ (Zagzebski 2007: 262); God ‘knows of every true proposition that 
it is true’ (Swinburne 1977: 162); an omniscient being ‘knows every true 
proposition and believes no false ones’ (Plantinga and Grim 1993: 267), 
and ‘[f]or any x, and for any proposition p, x is omniscient if and only if 
if it is true that p, then x knows that p’ (Nagasawa 2008: 7).
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God knows all truths about the physical world, about tables and 
chairs, and neutrinos and quarks – ‘he looks to the ends of the earth 
and sees everything under the heavens’ (Job 28:24).1 He also knows all 
truths about minded individuals; ‘before him no creature is hidden, but 
all are open and laid bare to the eyes of him with whom we have to do’ 
(Hebrews 4:13); ‘whether you hide what is in your hearts or reveal it, 
God knows it all’ (Qur’an 3:28) – ‘The lord knoweth the thoughts of 
men’ (Psalm 93:11).2 God knows, for example, that I live in the uK and 
that I grow asparagus. And, if God is omniscient he must also know that 
I am thinking certain thoughts – that I believe Alice Coltrane played the 
harp and that I  covet my neighbour’s bosch chainsaw. He also knows 
the meaning of the words that I utter: he understands me when I  say 
‘the asparagus is fresh’ since the fact that I am referring to a certain state 
of affairs with those words is a  fact about me, a  speaker, a part of the 
world – and God knows all p. ‘For there is not a word in my tongue, but, 
lo, o lorD, thou knowest it altogether’ (Psalm 139:4).3
Don Cupitt, however, argues that God’s omniscience should not be 
seen in this way; it should not be ‘understood as if there were a super-
intelligence of infinite capacity, its memory stocked with all true 
propositions’ (1980: 85). The bible never represents God as knowing 
what everybody else knows; God is only interested in what is hidden, 
in mysteries and in practical wisdom; the sacred texts of the Abrahamic 
religions do not explicitly state that God knows all p.
God’s business [rather] is with sifting, discerning, weighing in the 
balance, searching out and discriminating, because God is judge, and 
judges have to know the whole truth in order to pass just judgment. 
God is only interested in religiously-relevant knowledge, not knowledge 
in general  ... God’s knowledge is always, and above all, knowledge of 
1 I assume that such accounts of God’s omniscience – those that constitute part of the 
definition of the ‘God of the philosophers’ – are attempts to express the nature of God as 
described in the sacred texts of the Abrahamic religions. Part of my motivation for the 
claims below concerning God and empathy come from attempting to align an account of 
God’s omniscience with the relationship that God is taken to have with man in those texts.
2 See also luke 12:2–3: ‘For there is nothing covered, that shall not be revealed; neither 
hid, that shall not be known. / Therefore whatsoever ye have spoken in darkness shall be 
heard in the light; and that which ye have spoken in the ear in closets shall be proclaimed 
upon the housetops.’
3 It is thus suggested that God is omniscient with respect to the semantic content of human 
languages. my argument, though, focuses on the conceptual content of thoughts. I shall not 
consider here the relation between semantic content and conceptual, cognitive content.
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mysteries and secrets. It is always knowledge of things men do not know, 
do not want to know, do not want to become publicly known, or do not 
yet know. (ibid.)
It should be noted, though, that Cupitt has an anti-realist conception of 
God. God is not seen as a being, but rather as ‘a unifying symbol that ... 
personifies and represents to us everything that spirituality requires of 
us’ (ibid.: 9). omniscience is thus understood in terms of self-knowledge 
and the searching of our own hearts. I  shall not consider this kind of 
anti-realist approach, although it may be interesting to explore how my 
claims below concerning empathy could relate to this Cupittian account. 
empathetic understanding of others – and even of oneself at other 
times – could be a requirement of the spiritual life.4
others claim that knowledge of certain trivial truths is beneath God’s 
dignity:5 it is not demanded of God that he know the number of objects 
on my desk or nails in my garage. God’s knowledge can be perfect even 
though it does not encompass such inventories.6, 7
I shall not discuss here whether God’s knowledge should be seen as 
limited in such ways since even on these accounts it is still the case that 
God must have knowledge of minds, at least of some minds, some of the 
time. even though, for example, there may be certain thoughts that are 
too trivial to be the concern of God – whether I believe I am running 
short of 25mm nails – there are other thoughts, those of religious 
significance, that are his concern.
4 See n10. I thank Professor beverley Clack for this suggestion.
5 There is, however, some tension here since in places scripture does suggest that God 
has knowledge of trivial facts: ‘Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And one of them 
shall not fall on the ground without your father / but the very hairs of your head are all 
numbered’ (matthew 10:29–30; see also luke 12:6–7). And in the Qur’an (6:59) it is stated 
that ‘He has knowledge of all that land and sea contain: every leaf that falls is known to 
Him. There is no grain of soil in the darkest bowels of the earth, nor anything green or 
sear, but is recorded in a glorious book’.
6 This is a neo-Platonist view. See r. Sorabji, Philosophy of Commentators 200–600 AD: 
A Sourcebook (london: Duckworth, 2004); Alexander [of Aphrodisias], On Providence 
13: 14–17, 25: 1–16.
7 It has also been argued that there are other limits to God’s omniscience. Swinburne 
claims that God is not omniscient with respect to the future, and this is consonant with 
certain passages of scripture where God is seen to change his plans and make conditional 
promises (see Swinburne 1977: 177). Scripture, though, if taken literally, suggests wider 
gaps in omniscience: ‘the lorD god called unto Adam, and said unto him, where art 
thou?’ (Genesis 3:8) and at Genesis 18 God has to go to Sodom to check for himself what 
has occurred there.
20 DAN o’brIeN
God’s omniscience is not only seen in quantitative terms – in terms 
of God knowing all p, or all religiously-relevant p – but also in terms of 
the manner in which he has such knowledge. God does not acquire his 
knowledge via observation or inference, but directly – by intuition. one 
way to think of such intuition is to consider our knowledge of (simple) 
a priori truths. That 2 + 2 = 4 is something of which I am immediately 
aware; I do not have to infer this is true. my knowledge of this truth is, if 
you like, Godlike – it cannot be improved upon.
[W]ith regard to those few [truths] which the human intellect does 
understand, I believe that its knowledge equals the divine in objective 
certainty, for here it succeeds in understanding necessity, beyond which 
there can be no greater sureness. (Galileo, cited in Craig 1987: 19)
It is easy to see how this analogy can be extended to God’s knowledge 
of complex mathematical truths. He is immediately aware that complex 
equations are true just as we are capable of seeing that 2 + 2 = 4. And 
such knowledge extends to empirical and metaphysical matters. Causal 
relations are seen as ‘intelligible’, that is, it is possible for a  powerful 
intellect or God to work out – a priori – or ‘see’, the effects that follow 
from particular causes:8 God can intuit, before the cue ball is hit, the 
resting position of all the balls after a snooker break. He also has intuitive 
knowledge of metaphysical necessities such as that water consists of 
H20. This is one aspect of what edward Craig (1987: Ch. 1) calls the 
Image of God hypothesis; our certainty with respect to a priori truths is 
akin to God’s certainty with respect to all truth: all p are directly present 
to his consciousness.
Some also argue that God’s knowledge should not be seen as 
propositional; his thoughts are not ‘broken up into proposition-sized 
bits’ (Alston 1986: 288). God does not know, one, that Dan covets the 
chainsaw, two, that water is H20, and three, that neutrinos can travel 
faster than the speed of light. The alternative is to see God’s knowledge as 
‘a seamless whole, an undifferentiated intuition of all there is’ (ibid.). This 
is the view of Augustine, Aquinas and Anselm. According to Aquinas 
God has divine simplicity, thus ruling out the complexity of propositional 
structure. Thus, ‘God does not  ... analyse reality into various separate 
facts, each of which is internally complex, and then organize them into 
some kind of system.’ (ibid.)
8 This is a conception of our knowledge of causality against which Hume inveighs.
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He knows what can be enunciated, not after its manner, as if in His 
intellect there were composition or division of enunciations, but He 
knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence 
of each thing (Aquinas ST, 1a, 24, 14).
A  feature of the propositional conception of divine thought that is 
seen as problematic is its representational nature. Propositions represent 
things out in the world. but, Alston (1986: 293) argues:
[a] creature in our condition needs inner representations in order to be 
able to think about absent states of affairs, since the facts are rarely if ever 
directly present to our consciousness. but since God enjoys the highest 
form of knowledge He is never in that position, and so He has no need 
for inner representations that He can ‘carry around with Him’ for use 
when the facts are absent. The facts are never absent from His awareness.
one aspect of the picture that Alston rejects is cognitive internalism: the 
content of thought wholly determined by inner mental items. one could, 
however, reject this and see God’s knowledge as externalist in character – 
the content of divine thought determined by the relation between God 
and the objects he is thinking about. Such accounts, though, can still be 
seen to hold to a propositional account of thought: a thinker’s cognitive 
relation to the chainsaw constituting a different thought (or proposition) 
to that constituted by his cognitive relation to Alice Coltrane. Alston’s 
suggestion is thus more radical. It calls for not just a rejection of inner 
representations, but all representations. one way to think of this is to see 
all of God’s knowledge as knowledge by acquaintance: God’s openness 
to the whole of reality akin to our openness to sensory input. Sellars’ 
(1956: VIII, 32–6) myth of the given, however, casts a shadow over such 
a picture, but this will not be explored here.
Another problem with a  non-propositional conception of divine 
thought is that it is not clear how God’s knowledge can encompass the 
colour of the sky and of Himalayan poppies without ‘the seamless whole’ 
of God’s knowledge somehow involving something like the concept 
blue that applies to those parts of the world, but not, say, to brazilian 
football shirts and primroses; nor how God’s knowledge can encompass 
the colour of the sky and mary’s belief about the colour of the sky without 
somewhere in this ‘whole’ there being two constituents sharing something 
like the propositional content, the sky is blue. As, however, I am focusing 
on the omni-God tradition, I  shall not press these objections; I  shall 
simply assume that God’s thought is propositional since that is part of 
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the traditional picture, the claim being that if p, then God knows that p. 
God has knowledge of all (or all religiously-relevant) true propositions.
Various arguments focus on the alleged incompatibility between 
God’s omniscience – in particular his omniscience with respect to human 
thought – and his other divine attributes. If God is to know everything 
there is to know about my thinking he must know that I believe it is now 
rather cold and that it looks rather pleasant over there. Knowledge of 
human thought involves indexical knowledge, yet God, not being located 
at a  particular point in space and time, cannot have such knowledge. 
omniscience with respect to the mind could also encompass what 
someone will come to think or intend or believe, and there are problems 
associated with God’s foreknowledge of our mental actions and human 
free will. There are also several related arguments to the conclusion 
that God’s divine attributes limit his possession or understanding of 
certain concepts. God cannot understand the concepts of surprise, 
tiredness, lust, fear or despair because he cannot be surprised (since he 
is omniscient), tired, fearful or despairing (because he is omnipotent) or 
lustful (because he is without sin). A common approach is to conclude 
from such incompatibility arguments that the omni-God cannot exist.9
This, though, is not my strategy. my starting point is a  picture of 
God’s knowledge in which he has knowledge (of at least some) of our 
thoughts and that this knowledge is propositional. I aim in what follows 
to highlight tensions within this picture, specifically between the direct, 
intuition-based nature of his knowledge and necessary aspects of what 
it is to have knowledge of other minds (the topic to which we turn in 
the next section) and I will thus suggest that we need to rethink how we 
should conceive of God’s omniscience.
II. THe ePISTemoloGICAl reAl DISTINCTIoN
Descartes proposed a  ‘real Distinction’ between mind and body, 
between the two types of substance that compose human beings. Greg 
mcCulloch (1999) calls this the ‘ontological real distinction’, in contrast 
to the ‘epistemological real distinction’ between the way we acquire 
understanding of the physical world and the way we have of coming 
to understand the thoughts of others. In interpreting thinkers, he 
claims, we must empathize with them: understanding someone’s words, 
9 For a useful survey of such arguments, see Nagasawa 2008: 17–73.
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thoughts and actions involves being able to think the thoughts that they 
entertained when they said, thought or performed them.
Support for this claim can be found in Collingwood’s (1946) account 
of historical knowledge. For him, history is constituted by the thoughts 
of its agents; history is an investigation of mind.
The processes of nature can ... be ... described as sequences of mere events, 
but those of history cannot. They are not processes of mere events but 
processes of actions, which have an inner side, consisting of processes 
of thought; and what the historian is looking for is these processes of 
thought. All history is the history of thought. (ibid.: 215)
History should be concerned with making the actions of those in the 
past intelligible and this will involve appreciating their reasons for acting 
as they did. Further, Collingwood claims that the practice of historical 
investigation uses the very same methods that we use in understanding 
each other. ‘The  ... historical method is the only way I  can know the 
mind of another.’ (ibid.: 219)
If it is by historical thinking that we re-think and so re-discover the 
thought of Hammurabi or Solon [babylonian king and Athenian 
statesman respectively], it is in the same way that we rediscover the 
thought of a  friend who writes us a  letter, or a  stranger who crosses 
the street. (ibid.: 218)
but what are the methods of history, those that Collingwood sees 
encompassing the interpretation of the past and each other?10 empathy 
plays a  crucial role. We empathize with historical figures through ‘re-
enacting’ their various predicaments and simulating their accompanying 
mental states.
When I understand what Nelson meant by saying ‘in honour I won them, 
in honour I will die with them’, what I am doing is to think myself into the 
position of being all covered with decorations and exposed at short range 
to the musketeers in the enemy’s tops, and being advised to make myself 
a  less conspicuous target  ... understanding the words means thinking 
for myself what Nelson thought when he spoke them  ... unless I were 
capable – perhaps only transiently – of thinking that for myself, Nelson’s 
words would remain meaningless to me. (Collingwood 1939: 112)
10 Collingwood also sees self-knowledge as derived via a  historical and therefore 
empathetic approach: ‘it is only by historical thinking that I can discover what I thought 
ten years ago, by reading what I  then wrote, or what I  thought five minutes ago, by 
reflecting on the action I then did’ (1946: 219).
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These examples suggest a  rich empirical account of the psychology of 
understanding others, one involving make-believe or simulation. Such 
details, though, need not concern us here; it is only the bare bones of 
the empathetic account of understanding upon which my argument 
depends. To see what these are, and to see why empathy is essential for 
understanding, I shall turn to Quine and mcCulloch.
Quine focuses on what he calls radical translation: the coming 
to understand utterances and thoughts of an alien community from 
scratch. All we have to go on is the behaviour of the native speakers. And 
this, he claims, is also true of our understanding of each other. radical 
translation highlights the nature of all understanding. In communicating 
with one another all we have to go on is the behavioural evidence. And:
In general the underlying methodology of the idiom of propositional 
attitudes contrasts strikingly with the spirit of objective science  ... 
[W]e project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indications, 
we imagine the speaker’s state of mind to have been, and then we say 
what, in our language, is natural and relevant for us in the state thus 
feigned ... [W]hat is involved is evaluation, relative to specific purposes, 
of an essentially dramatic act. (Quine 1960: 218–9)
As the native utters ‘gavagai’ we consider what we would have said if we 
were him.11 We may perhaps have been drawn to utter ‘rabbit’ – given that 
there’s a cute furry creature in front of him – and so we forward this as 
a translation of his utterance. To check whether this is a good translation 
we can try out ‘gavagai’ in other situations in which we take ‘rabbit’ to 
be appropriate. If signs of approval are elicited from the natives, then we 
will make a start on our translation manual; if not, then ‘rabbit’ would be 
rejected and further empathetic acts would have to be attempted.
Following mcCulloch, let us consider the home case in which we 
come to understand an utterance made by someone of our own linguistic 
community. As we interpret the words of a friend we do not just ascertain 
that he makes a  certain noise: ‘ra - bit’. rather, we interpret him as 
saying that a rabbit is over there. one must understand what the speaker 
means by ‘rabbit’. In order to interpret the thoughts of a thinker we must 
11 It is not required that, in empathizing with another, we become another (in some 
sense). As Hume says concerning empathy in the context of his account of moral 
judgment: ‘No force of imagination can convert us into another person’ (1772: 234). 
rather, we imagine what we would say or feel if we were in the position of someone else, 
if we had their character and beliefs, and we could see what they see.
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understand the content of the propositional attitude ascriptions that we 
make. And, ‘[o]nly if I can understand your words in your way can I gain 
full-blooded understanding of you as a subject of propositional attitudes’ 
(mcCulloch 1999: 34). Similarly with respect to the natives: to ascribe 
propositional attitudes to them, we must come to understand ‘gavagai’ 
in the way that they do. When one has, one can then go about finding 
expression for this in one’s home idiom. one understands and then one 
translates. The ‘true measure of understanding is the view from inside, 
not the take-home message’ (ibid.: 42).
As John mcDowell puts it, one cannot come to understand others 
from ‘side-on’; it is not the case that:
when we work at making someone intelligible, we exploit relations we 
can already discern between the world and something already in view as 
a system of concepts within which the other person thinks; so that as we 
come to fathom the content of the initially opaque conceptual capacities 
that are operative within the system, we are filling in detail in a sideways-
on picture – here the conceptual system, there the world – that has been 
available all along, though only in outline. It must be an illusion to 
suppose that this fits the work of interpretation we need in order to come 
to understand some people. (1994: 34–5)
There is therefore an important distinction between how we attempt to 
understand each other and how we attempt to understand the physical 
world, and it is empathy that grounds this distinction. When interpreting 
a  physical system we work ‘from the outside’, applying concepts we 
already understand to the observational evidence. In order to interpret 
the mental states of a thinker, however, we must attempt to instantiate 
the very intentional make-up that she is manifesting. Folk psychology is, 
in Quine’s words, an ‘essentially dramatic idiom’ (1960: 219).
Quine, however, is an eliminativist with respect to meaning and 
content. He argues – via the indeterminacy of translation (1960: Ch. 2) 
and the inscrutability of reference (1990: 50–2) – that the objective, 
extensional evidence available to the radical interpreter cannot provide 
a  determinate interpretation of the native’s thoughts. There is thus 
nothing propositional in the mind there to be known. empathy may 
provide us with interpretations, but these do not have scientific status 
and thus they do not pick out real features of the mind. one can, though, 
as mcCulloch does, reject Quine’s sceptical conclusions whilst keeping 
his insight with regards to empathy.
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other-understanding ... involves not just understanding their words in 
their way, but also the ability to use those words in their way, as vehicles 
of self-expression. So ... if I am to fully understand you as a subject of 
propositional attitudes, then I  standardly have to be able to deploy 
a  dramatic idiom, to go in for the kind of self-expression (at least in 
make-believe) that you are capable of. It is a matter of getting inside your 
thinking by imagining and then saying how it is for you, which involves 
acquiescing (at least in make-believe) in your words as you acquiesce in 
them. otherwise, I at best have objectifying knowledge of you as a dealer 
in objects that happen to be words, and at worst substitute my own usage 
and thinking for yours. (mcCulloch 1999: 35)
In order to be able to understand another it is required that an interpreter 
appreciates how thoughts are taken as reasons for action and subsequent 
thought. To ‘get inside my thinking’ you need to appreciate which 
beliefs of mine are currently driving my behaviour – that, for example, 
concerning the cutting-power of the bosch, not the difficulty in buying 
new chains – and how my actions and thought follow from the norms of 
rationality and perhaps my idiosyncratic twists on these norms. Further, 
you may not take the design of the handguard as adding to the saw’s 
desirability, but to understand me you must come to appreciate how 
I  would do so – you must understand how beliefs can be reasons for 
me.12 Thus, to have knowledge of what another is thinking one must be 
able to think thoughts with the same content as theirs – ‘understand their 
words in their way’.
This is the core of the empathetic account upon which I shall focus. 
my conclusions concern the essential nature of the understanding of 
others.13 They concern what this must consist in for you, me, and for 
everyone, including God. my strategy would not therefore be accepted 
by those with an apophatic conception of God, by those who claim 
that we cannot provide any positive account of the nature of God’s 
understanding and knowledge.14 It should be stressed, though, that I am 
not claiming that God must understand us in just the same way as we 
12 See Stueber’s arguments from the essential contextuality and indexicality of 
thoughts as reasons (2006: 155–65).
13 This may strike one as odd given that my thoughts are developed from those 
of Quine who rejects the notion of the a priori and of necessary truths. Full-blooded 
Quineans, however, can take my claims not to be a priori or necessary, but to be those 
that are deep within our web of belief, far from the periphery where claims can be tested 
against experience.
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understand each other, by, say, literally observing our gesticulations and 
hearing what we say. And it may be true that there are possible worlds in 
which we have very different ways of coming to understand each other; 
perhaps worlds where there is telepathy – an ability to which we shall 
return below. but my claim is that, whatever particular mechanisms may 
be involved, understanding others must always involve empathy, given 
the broad account of empathy with which I am working.14
I have, then, made certain very general claims about knowledge of 
other minds (§2) and the divine mind (§1). The question that now arises 
is whether this empathetic conception of the knowledge of minds is 
compatible with the intuition-based model we have of the divine mind, 
and it is this I shall go on to discuss.
III. GoDeSe
God does not speak or think in english and so, if we accept that divine 
thought is propositional, then we must see it as involving concepts of 
a divine language; we can think of God as thinking in Godese. And, since 
he thinks in Godese and we think in english, we are natives to him. He is 
thus required to empathize with our thought in order to understand us.15
God should not though be seen as in the radical position that Quine 
describes. He has access to more evidence for interpretation than we do 
with respect to the native. We only have the behavioural evidence to go on 
whereas God knows the states of our brains and/or the states of our spirits 
when we think our thoughts, and he has this knowledge, not through 
inference, but via intuition – but this, I shall argue, is problematic.
When interpreting the natives we listen to their utterances, but there 
is nothing about a certain noise (‘gav-a-guy’) that carries with it its own 
14 Demea, the mystic in Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, claims that: 
‘we ought never to imagine, that we comprehend the attributes of this divine being, 
or to suppose, that his perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of 
a human creature. Wisdom, thought, design, knowledge; these we justly ascribe to him; 
because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other language or other 
conceptions, by which we can express our adoration of him. but let us beware, lest we 
think, that our ideas any wise correspond to his perfections, or that his attributes have 
any resemblance to these qualities among men.’ (Hume, 1779: 44) – ‘Great is the lord, 
and greatly to be praised and his greatness is unsearchable.’ (Psalm 145:3)
15 It could be argued that the model of radical translation, on which I  base my 
argument, is not appropriate since God created us. To resist this claim, though, think 
about our own children: we bring them into being, but sometimes we do not understand 
their actions or thinking, that is, until we attempt to empathize with them.
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interpretation – the reference to rabbits somehow contained in the 
sounds of their voices and thus directly perceptible to us; that would be 
imbuing noises with what Putnam calls a  ‘magical theory of reference’ 
(1981: 3–5). There are no magical connections between words, mental 
images and the things in the world that those items are about: ‘even 
a large and complex system of representations, both verbal and visual, 
still does not have an intrinsic, built-in, magical connection with what it 
represents.’ (ibid.: 5)
In order to interpret what someone means by that utterance we have 
to see how the word ‘gavagai’ is used and come to be able to think the 
thoughts that elicit such utterances. And just as there is nothing about 
the sound ‘gav-a-guy’ that wears its meaning on its sleeve, there is also 
nothing about certain brain or spirit states that does either. God too, 
therefore, must be able to think the thoughts that elicit utterances in our 
languages. God must be able to think the thoughts that I am entertaining 
when I  say that ‘Alice’s harp-playing is transcendent’ and that ‘Paul’s 
chainsaw is powerful’.16
It is not clear, though, how this is possible – how God, that is, could 
directly, via intuition, come to be able to think our thoughts. As mcCulloch 
puts it, in the context of the native, this would only be possible:
if we found self-announcing ideas-of-rabbits in the skull ... but we know 
we shan’t find any of them ... These items would not only need to constitute 
the alien’s understanding of her words, but also, on inspection as it were, 
transmit it to the outsider. What an idea! (mcCulloch 1999: 41)
But this is an idea that permeates the history of philosophy and theology. 
It is there in both scholastic accounts of divine thought and in early 
modern accounts of thought and reasoning.
Aquinas claims that angels can read human minds, and they can do 
this much like we do ourselves – only better – that is, via behaviour: ‘more 
deeply they penetrate those occult bodily manifestations’ (ST, 1, 57, 4) 
that reveal our thoughts. They do not, however, reason to the conclusion 
16 For the purposes of this paper I wish to remain neutral on the metaphysics of mind. 
my claims concerning empathy apply whether one is a dualist or a materialist of either 
a  reductivist or non-reductivist stripe. even if there were, for example, a  plausible 
naturalistic account of thought, God could not read off the content of our minds via direct 
intuitions of the particular causal laws involved. Interpreting thought involves making 
the thinker intelligible – in their terms – and this, I  have argued, requires empathy. 
‘A unified account of neuroscientific explanations of every single bodily movement of 
some person does not constitute a biography’ (Sandis 2011: 193).
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that we are (for example) happy from observation of our smiles; they 
do not, first, observe behaviour and then infer that mental states are the 
cause of it. rather, angels see or intuit our mental states as if through 
the behaviour: ‘as an object and its image are seen simultaneously in 
a mirror’ (ST, 1, 58, 3).17
He also claims that angels have the ability to know our secret 
thoughts, those without bodily manifestation. This ability, though, 
cannot be exercised because ‘what is proper to God does not belong to 
the angels. but it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts, according 
to Jer. 17:19, “The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable; 
who can know it? I am the lord, Who search the heart”’ (ST, I, 57, 4). 
ockham has a similar story. Angels have the power to read each other’s 
minds and those of humans – directly, via intuition (I. Q6) – but again 
there is the claim that only God can ‘scrutinize hearts’ (IV, Q9); angels 
only being able to do this when God wills they can. Thus, the scholastics 
accept that God can read our minds and he can do this via something 
like perception, albeit telepathic perception. And, in a  recent paper, 
Torin Alter ‘see[s] no reason to doubt that God could directly perceive 
the contents of human consciousness – by telepathy’ (2002: 9).
A ‘perceptual model’ of knowledge is also a theme in early modern 
philosophy. The Cartesian picture is that our mind is transparent to 
ourselves – to our inner eye – and thus we have complete and infallible 
knowledge of our own mental states. Craig argues that such knowledge is 
another aspect of the Image of God hypothesis: the knowledge we have of 
our own mental states akin to God’s knowledge of reality (above we noted 
how our a priori knowledge is seen as akin to divine knowledge). This is 
also a conception of the divine mind to which Newton was committed. 
17 ockham, in contrast, argues that angels reason in much the same way we do, 
they infer that we have thoughts from our behaviour. There are, though, problems in 
accounting for this ability. There are various ways it has been claimed that we can have 
knowledge of other minds, but none of these look to be available to angels. I could infer 
that your smile indicates happiness since this is so in my own case. Angels, however, 
do not have bodily manifestations of mental states. A theoretical account of the mind 
would also be difficult to attribute to angels since on such accounts our knowledge of 
our own mind piggy-backs on knowledge of others (see Sellars’ myth of Jones, 1956: 
90–117) and it would be difficult to accept that angelic self-knowledge depends on 
knowledge of a  theory concerning human thought. We can also come to know what 
someone else is feeling (and thinking) via sympathetic mechanisms – such as those 
involved in the contagiousness of smiles and yawns – but again, it is not clear how these 
could be relevant to angels.
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We perceive images – ‘sense data’ in twentieth century parlance – in 
our ‘sensorium’ (Cartesian theatre) and our intimate relation with such 
images provides us with certain knowledge of them; God’s sensorium, 
Newton claims, is space.
[God] sees the things themselves intimately, and thoroughly perceives 
them, and comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to 
himself; of which things the Images only carried through the organs of 
Sense into our little Sensoriums, are there seen and beheld by that which 
in us perceives and thinks (Newton 1704: III, 1, 20).
God’s knowledge of minds is presumably of the same order. our thoughts 
are immediately present to him; he ‘thoroughly perceives them, and 
comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to himself ’.18
The immediacy of God’s knowledge may not be seen as obviously 
incompatible with empathetic understanding. This is because it would 
seem we can have something akin to intuitive knowledge of other minds. 
We do not infer that someone is in pain when they are writhing on the 
floor, and we do not normally infer what someone means from the words 
that they utter; rather, pains are seen in their movements and meanings 
are heard in their utterances. mcCulloch talks of phenomenological facts 
being available to the interpreter. God, then, having knowledge of all p 
would know such facts and thus understand our thoughts.
Such facts, though, are not straightforwardly observable, aspects of 
thinkers that are just there to be seen by anyone looking, like perhaps 
the colour of their hair. They are the kind of facts that become manifest 
when one adopts the perspective of the thinker; when one manages to 
empathize with their thought. And so talk of phenomenological facts 
and of seeing pains and hearing meaning is no less problematic for 
conceptions of the divine mind. It is not clear how God can come to 
know such facts through intuition, conceived as some kind of purely 
perceptual ability; knowledge of such facts requires empathy.19
18 reasoning is also seen in perceptual terms in the early modern period. locke, 
for example, sees reason as essentially perceptual: we directly perceive the evidential 
connections between ideas (both deductive and inductive). Hume can be seen as rejecting 
such a conception of reason, replacing it with a mechanistic account (see millican 2012).
19 It could be claimed that God could empathize with human thought through Christ. 
There are, though, philosophical problems with the incarnation, and any such strategy 
would merely seem to transpose the difficulties in understanding from between God and 
man – how can he understand us? – to between God and Christ. I shall not explore these 
issues here.
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If God is to understand our thoughts the divine mind must be more 
active; he must empathize with our thinking – think our thoughts for 
himself. If God does have telepathic abilities then such abilities – if they 
are to constitute understanding – must involve God coming to have 
thoughts with the same content as ours. Divine mindreading cannot 
be purely perceptual. That would involve a picture in which our minds 
contain magical world-directed symbols, and this is untenable.
Science can be said to adopt a God’s eye view; it attempts to describe 
the world sub species aeternitatis. In §2 we saw that Quine argues 
that mind and meaning do not come into focus from this elevated 
perspective; they are thus not real constituents of nature. He is a sceptic 
with respect to the content of language and thought. mcCulloch sees 
such scepticism as a reductio of the assumption that all truths must be 
accessible to the God’s eye view, and he develops a positive picture of 
how empathy must be involved in understanding others. The dispute 
between Quine and mcCulloch concerns a  metaphorical reading of 
this God’s eye perspective whereas the considerations of this paper are 
concerned with a  literal reading: just as Quine argues that the mind 
cannot be apprehended by the God’s eye view of science, I  argue that 
there are problems in accounting for how the mind can be apprehended 
by the detached perspective of God – God, the actual being.20
The problem here is distinct from that concerning knowledge de 
se. Certain incompatibility arguments focus on the indexical nature of 
some beliefs: I  have the belief that I  covet the chainsaw, not just that 
somebody does – and, the argument goes – not even God can come to 
have such knowledge since God cannot be me.21 my argument, however, 
does not focus on indexical thoughts, but on thoughts that can be shared 
by various thinkers. many of us can believe that bosch chainsaws are 
objects of desire, but the question that concerns us here is how God can 
come to understand that this is the content of our belief.
Perhaps the picture must be something more like the following. 
Divine intuition must involve God coming to see through our eyes, 
somehow inhabiting our mind and having first-hand experience of 
20 There is some scriptural support for the claim that God cannot understand evil 
thoughts – thoughts that would be incompatible with his omnibenevolence – and some 
theists defend the notion of divine impassibility, where God cannot experience (or 
understand) human negative emotions and suffering. my concerns, though, are wider; 
they focus on tensions in the picture of the divine understanding of all human thought.
21 See Grim 1985.
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our mental states. (A picture perhaps suggested by Qur’an 50.16: ‘God 
is close to man, nearer to him than his jugular vein.’) Whether this is 
illuminating, though, depends on just how such a picture is understood. 
It would not be enough for God just to be acquainted – even from the 
inside – with our thoughts. This is the core of Wittgenstein’s rejection of 
Cartesianism. God’s knowledge of human thought should not be seen 
as akin to God having an access-all-areas pass to our private Cartesian 
theatres, reading off the meanings of the symbols he finds paraded there. 
‘If God had looked into our [Cartesian] minds he would not have been 
able to see there whom we were speaking of ’ (1953: II, 185). Such a picture 
of thought is still magical, however closely God is acquainted with our 
minds. If God somehow inhabited our mind and was acquainted with 
the mental states there, he would not – from such acquaintance alone – 
be able to ascertain the content of our thoughts.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight tensions in a  common 
picture of the divine mind, one that forms part of the conception of the 
omni-God. God is seen as having propositional thought and as knowing 
every true proposition, and he is able to have such knowledge via direct 
intuition. I have argued, though, that in the context of God’s knowledge 
of other minds, this picture seemingly adheres to an unacceptable 
magical theory of reference. I suggest, then, that we need to think more 
carefully about the model of the divine mind and particularly about how 
God can have knowledge of our minds. And we need to get this right 
because much of religious significance depends on such knowledge. In 
order for God to be able to help us, answer our prayers, guide us, judge 
us and forgive us he must be able to understand our thoughts. Further, as 
John Kvanvig (1986) argues, to be unconditionally loved by God requires 
that nothing is hidden from him. my suggestion, then, is that empathy 
needs to be included in the picture of the divine mind.22, 23
22 rogers also suggests that some kind of empathy needs to be included in our picture 
of the divine mind: ‘As a movie-goer I can appreciate the gangster’s joy in the violence 
which expresses his personal power and freedom without literally doing the things he 
does and without (I hope) incurring the guilt that, were he a real human being, he would 
incur. I can understand, and in a sense even share, his feelings, without being him or 
even being at all like him. Perhaps God is the perfect audience, able to understand and 
appreciate our feelings fully, without becoming us or becoming like us’ (2000: 88–9). It 
is not clear, though, how such empathy is possible without God in some sense becoming 
like us.
23 Thanks to audiences at the Minds: Human and Divine conference in munich, the 
British Philosophy of Religion conference in oxford, the philosophy research seminar 
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